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to drink the tea served to them, my supervisor addressed the matter by asking the
group the reason for the wastage. As a sheltered, urban, seventeen year old, I
remained blissfully unaware of this refusal--and its vast implications--and was
dumbstruck by their sheepish responses. Their justifications were especially
shocking to me, because I had never observed such discrimination so closely,
and because my history lessons had assured me that Gandhi had put an end to it.
Furthermore, that these biases were held by teachers responsible for educating
and destroying regressive values in future generations, forced me to confront the
debilitating persistence of prejudice. It is such beliefs that affirmative action has
the Herculean task of dismantling. “The chai wala is a Harijan. We cannot touch
the cups” one teacher responded quietly from the corner.
This thesis has provided me with the fulfilling opportunity to
deconstruct my long-held beliefs and analyze the roots of internalized biases
from a more factual basis that considers the relevant historical context. For this
possibility, I would like to express my gratitude towards the Claremont
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Affirmative Action in India is one of the oldest cases of positive discrimination
in the world. The struggle with positive discrimination has always been in the
tension between the primordial and constructivist worldviews of different castes,
religions, and ethnic groupings. With the caste system as the basis for ritual,
social and economic gradation since the inception of the Vedic Hinduism, the
crafters of the new democratic, secular, and independent India wanted to seek
reparations for those who were previously tainted as “outcasts”. These “outcasts”
were mostly defined as those below the lowest caste, the “Shudras”, and later
expanded to encompass the Shudras and ostensibly economically weaker groups
as well.
These outcasts comprised of groups known today as Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes. Scheduled Castes are considered socio-economically
lower than the Shudras on the Varna scale and were known as “Dalits” or
“Untouchables”. The Scheduled Tribes were “tribals” who were considered
indigenous natives outside Hinduism, when it was created during the Vedic
period around 1500 BCE. This included the descendants of the ancient Naga
tribe, adivasis of Jharkhand, or island inhabitants in the Andaman and Nicobar
Islands for example. Twenty three per cent of all government opportunities and
positions in public higher educational institutions were reserved for the
Scheduled Castes and Tribes (15 per cent of which were for Scheduled Castes
and 7.5-8 per cent for Scheduled Tribes) as per the Constitution in 1950, enacted
3

three years after independence from the British Empire. With the subsequent
practice of the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe focused “reservations”,
there remained certain sections of the population that were still disadvantaged.
The Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe reservations primarily targeted caste
distinctions based on the “outcasts” identified from the Varna system, and the
consequent inequality in professional opportunities for these groups. However,
inequality in educational opportunities remained, and thus so did literacy levels,
based on different financial statuses, gender, and social standings beyond the
theoretical Hindu caste system. The First Backward Classes Commission of 1953
identified backwardness along socioeconomic and gender lines, but identified
eligible members on the basis of caste. Although the Nehru government did not
approve this commission as Constitutional change, it was revised and expanded
with the Mandal Commission of 1980.
The crux of the caste system lies in the established distinctions in ritual
purity and pollution. The lowest castes are born the most polluted, whereas the
twice-born upper castes are born the purest. The lowest castes, for centuries,
have been hounded by social stigmas that harden and define the caste lines that
exist within the system. Association with the lowest castes implied pollution of
the self, and so lower castes were prohibited from temples, and professions
occupied by upper castes. Because “Castes historically tended to be
occupationally specific and confined to particular regions or even villages”, lines
of occupation in a given locale were determined at birth on the basis of ascriptive
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ethnic identities and passed down hereditarily1. This meant that lower castes
were relegated to perform the most demeaning and menial occupations for
centuries2.
While related, the caste system found in practice is separate from the
broader varna hierarchy. Each individual is born into a jati, which is assigned to
a varna, and “It is the jatis rather than the better-known varnas that form the nuts
and bolts of the caste system”3. In the literature on affirmative action and the
politics of the lower castes, and in this thesis, Brahmins, Kshatriyas, and
Vaishyas are referred to as forward castes, upper castes or “twice born”. In
reference to lower castes, “Shudras” on the varna scale roughly translate to Other
Backward Classes (OBCs), “Dalits” are referred to as Scheduled Castes (SCs) or
Untouchables, and “adivasis” or “tribals” are referred to as Scheduled Tribes
(STs). While it is common practice to use caste and sub-caste interchangeably in
the literature, this thesis will use caste to refer to varna classifications and subcastes to reference specific jatis.
The Mandal Commission of 1980 identified and set aside a “quota” of 27 per
cent for Other Backward Classes (OBCs), which extended reservations to more
sub-castes, on the stated basis of socio-economically backward communities.
From the population of the time of the Mandal Commission (drafted in the 1980s
but only put into effect in the 1990s), OBCs were estimated to make up 52 per
cent of the population (excluding Scheduled Castes and Tribes) and included
1
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3
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occupational sub-castes such as those of sweepers, laundrymen, leather smiths,
etc. This category includes some Muslim communities, but largely targets
Shudra sub-castes. Further, sub-castes considered OBCs in some states are not
necessarily classified as OBCs in other states; for example, Jats are OBCs in
Himachal Pradesh but not in Haryana.
One section of these originally identified OBCs was slightly above the
socioeconomic level of the reserved groups, and informally considered
“intermediate” castes. Intermediate castes would have taken the roles of
landlords but not landless farmers, or nomadic dairy farmers but not
leathersmiths. They were above the lowest OBCs, but below the upper castes,
and not socially discriminated against like the masses of OBCs the Mandal
Commission originally wanted to target. These intermediate castes came to
occupy the “creamy layer” of the OBC category, which had gained financial
power with the changes in the practice of the caste system since the dominance
of the British Raj.
While the intentions of the affirmative action policy in India were to
achieve the larger Constitutional goal of equality, complexities in the
consociational designation of sub-castes led to unintended consequences for the
nation as a whole. One criticism is that reservations were intended to mitigate
caste differences, but have instead aggravated caste identities by conferring them
with increased political salience. Today, reservations have become motivation
for political mobilization along caste lines: “when an Indian casts his vote, he too
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often votes his caste”4. Some argue that this has deepened communal divisions in
India. The mechanism for these exacerbated divisions lies in the animosity
between reserved castes and upper castes, the creamy layer and the most
backward classes, religious minorities and Hindu nationalists, i.e. the vocal
dominant in power and the appropriated groups of marginalized minorities.
India’s burgeoning population, of which the youth make up a majority, adds to
the pressure of competition over reserved seats in elite education institutes and
public sector jobs. The Supreme Court has set a maximum limit for all
reservations at Central and State levels at 50 per cent of offered positions.
Despite these limits, competition has definitely worsened for those in
general categories, but also for those qualifying for reservations. Yet, seats in
many colleges reserved for OBCs or Scheduled Castes and Tribes are not always
occupied. Furthermore, failure to secure acceptance to education institutes or
coveted government positions for general category applicants is often explained
by blaming the reserved categories for “taking their seats”. This creates a sense
of resentment towards backward classes within the forward castes, and casts
doubt as to the legitimacy of “merit” in the quota system. Simultaneously,
competition among OBCs for government jobs and admission to better
universities is compounded by the breadth of the OBC category. Within the OBC
group there is financial and regional disparity. With an OBC classification that is
too large, the chances of the truly needy OBC members, those not counted as the
creamy layer, to benefit from the reservation is limited. The reservation policy,
4

Tharoor, 2015.
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as it stands today, must refine the OBC eligibility criteria to benefit more
precisely those who most need it.
Since the 1980-90 period, when the Mandal Commission was drafted
and enacted, the demographic of these competing groups has shifted and
changed. As of the National Sample Survey of 1999-2000, 36 per cent of the
population self identified as OBCs. This figure increased to 44 per cent in the
2010-11 survey. When taking the Scheduled Castes and Tribes into account as
well, 73 per cent of the population will be eligible for reservations. This
demographic shift has also been accompanied with structural economic shifts.
Agriculture is no longer a lucrative employer, and government jobs offer more
competitive pay and benefits (with the provisions revised in the Seventh Pay
Commission). The share of the population living in poverty since the 1990s has
shrunk from an estimated 37 per cent to 22 per cent in the 2000s. Further, with
greater access to education, the number of claimants for non-farm jobs has
increased. Data suggests that the number of opportunities being offered by the
government are reducing: “15.3 per cent of men aged 22-39 with education level
of class 12 or more had a regular salaried job in the government or public sector,
this proportion fell to 11.7 per cent by 2011-12”5. With decreasing public sector
opportunities and increasing private sector employment, reservations for public
sector jobs are becoming progressively ineffectual for “upliftment”. What then
explains the claims of backwardness and increasing number of sub-castes on
State and National OBC lists?
5

Desai, 2006.
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Constructivist worldviews on caste based and religious distinctions
informed the early Indian Constitution drafters and their preferred means of
positive discrimination. While constructivism is granted by the literature to be a
more progressive alternative than the obsolete primordialist views, both are
closely connected--especially so for affirmative action. The question now,
seventy years after India’s democratization, remains whether perhaps both are
outdone by an ideal of assimilation. The answer to this comparison can be vital
in judging and drafting policies in an increasingly nationalist India.

9

Chapter 2: Identity and State Building in Post-independence
India

India, at the time of independence, was a diverse nation with various cultures,
languages, folk traditions, stories, food, dress, art, lifestyles and people. With the
nationalist sentiment used to mobilize a large coalition against the British--these
distinctions were diluted as a matter of convenience. Sub-national identities were
nested within the peoples’ Indian-ness. While this was effective for the
functioning of mechanisms such as the “Swadeshi” and “Boycott” movements
that defined the independence struggle, along with the symbolic salience of
Gandhi’s hunger strikes, ancient distinctions along communal lines still survived
the independence, modernization, and consequent democratization, of India.
Arguably, the most notable distinction was along Hindu-Muslim lines, leading to
the division of pre-independence India into modern day Pakistan and India. The
Kashmir question too remained pertinent, due to similar debates on state culture
and religions role in it, among other geopolitical claims. The division of India
and Pakistan also brought to the fore an age-old debate on the relationship
between the State and the identity of its citizens.
The role of the State in crafting identities is often looked at by modern
scholars as an overreaching national mandate. However, policies that eventually
end up prioritising certain identities can be rather difficult to judge a priori, for
example, “When the Constitution was framed, it was not as clear as it is today
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that caste would remain the basic unit of affirmative action”6. Constructivist
scholars celebrate the effectiveness of policies in crafting identities--the most
common assertion being that the British Census7 was responsible for designing
caste as it is practiced today8, and affirmative action for renewing it9. These
outcomes are especially ironic, considering that the original intentions behind
reservations for the framers of the Constitution was to dilute distinctions and do
away with caste based discrimination10. Although primordial and constructivist
thought are considered in opposition, analysis of the logic of affirmative action
for OBCs in India can reveal that both depend on the limitations posed by the
other.

I.

Definitions

The premises upon which any claims about identity lie are defined in
their conception of individual attributes. For ethnic identity, these attributes are
differentiated to various degrees as hereditary or externally adopted. The natural
implications of these attributes are their fixed nature or ability to be transformed.
Various theories capture these distinctions, and extrapolate the workings of the
individual in interaction with group and national identity or identities. The two
schools of thought that bound the spectrum are Primordialism and
Constructivism.
6

De Zwart 2000, 244.
More detail in Chapter 3: “A Natural Experiment”
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9
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In order to understand the unfortunate open-endedness of the category
of “Other Backward Classes”, one needs to understand how Primordialist and
Constructivist interpretations have maintained the vagueness of such categories.
Primordialist views are encapsulated in the belief that ethnicity is bound by
attributes only transferred to ingroups members via descent11. Ethnic identities
are fixed and immutable for Primordialists. Furthermore, primordial conceptions
view interests of an individual as representative of those of the group, thus
creating homogeneous blocs of ethnic interests. Ethnic grouping is perceived as
irrational, and interethnic hostility as a definite outcome due to “some
unaccountable import attributable to the very tie itself”12 within the ingroup.
Horowitz rightly notes that “Primordialism has become the straw man of ethnic
studies”13, and has been viewed as antiquated, chauvinistic, and almost the
equivalent of fundamentalist thought. While these criticisms may be valid,
Primordialism does perform the role of providing a starting point from which to
view ethnic identities and their political implications. The canon raises pertinent
questions at the heart of governance of multi-ethnic societies, albeit
pessimistically, and looks to State structure for solutions. Primordialist encasing
of caste groups has crafted the implication that these groups have competitive,
homogeneous, and observable demands. Unlike the Scheduled Castes and
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Tribes, the OBCs were not a singular caste group, but a classification of eligible
sub-castes14, that too one that was routinely revised and contested.
Constructivism views ethnic identities as multifaceted categories that
can be created and mutated by their political, economic, geographic, and social
contexts. According to Constructivism, the boundaries of ethnicity are actively
policed for stable identities or expanded for threatened ones, with rational,
competing, heterogenous group interests15. Ethnic categories can become more
or less salient to out or ingroup individuals, elites, institutions, and societies, and
have been theorized “as interests motivated by "the pragmatics of calculated
choice and opportunism" (Tambiah 1996: 21, also see Barth 1969), noting their
tendency to expand (assimilate) and contract (differentiate) to "fill the political
space available for [their] expression" (Horowitz 1975:137)”16. Ethnicity,
through a Constructivist lens, is burdened by social meanings and motivations
about what it means to identify. The four most well-known variants of
Constructivism are theories suggesting modernization for identity creation,
institutions for salience, rent seeking for ethnic identification, and political
entrepreneurship for reconstruction, as the causal link between the existing and
outcome “ethnic demographies”17. The constructivist dilemma18 lies in the
endogeneity of identity shift in the outcome change19, which critics argue makes
14

De Zwart 2000, 235.
Barth 1998, 10.
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19
Chandra 2001, 8.
15

13

Constructivism less parsimonious of a conception for ethnic studies than
Primordialism20. Caste, most scholars agree, is less of a primordialist ancient fact
and more of a constructed social identity in India. Affirmative Action, most
obviously the Mandal list of the 1980s, is the instrument that the State used in
making the OBC category salient, and identifying as OBC an incentive21. The
constructivist dilemma here lies in the relationship between affirmative action
and OBC identification salience. With greater affirmative action offered to
OBCs, incentives to identify as OBC also heighten. However, as more groups
identify as OBCs, through the mechanism of identity shift, more groups will
demand affirmative action. Consequently, identity shift as a result of heightened
salience is endogenous to the calculations of institutional incentives.
From a constructivist viewpoint, the effectiveness of affirmative action
as a means to reduce caste significance and discrimination seems equally likely
as unlikely. During the post-independence era, however, it was viewed by many
as a catalyst to the modernization mechanism by which India would divest itself
of caste distinctions. Caste based affirmative action works on a combination of
primordial beliefs. First, that a group can be identified from a whole, i.e.
members of particular castes or sub-caste can be identified distinctly from
members of others. Second, this group is homogeneously worse off than others,
either materially or historically discriminated against. Third, those who benefit
from the affirmative action will represent their group’s interests, for example, a

20
21

Bayar 2009, 1640.
De Zwart 2000, 245.
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legislative member of a particular caste will prioritise the interests of their caste.
While the foundation of affirmative action is laid on primordialism, the expected
outcomes are largely constructivist. First, caste identities can be mitigated.
Second, provisions from preferential treatment can combat and change
stereotypes. Third, these identity shifts can be brought about by an institution of
the State, in coordination with modernization mechanisms.
The applicability of primordial and constructivist explanations may be
debatable but the outcome is definitive. Castes and sub-castes as “forms of
stratification where upward mobility is denied”22 are still in existence in India
today. Despite the explicit consensus on the ills of the caste system, and the
expressed desires for its demise, the framers of India’s Constitution failed to
achieve their proposed goal of mitigating the divisions of ancient India. The next
section aims to dismantle the conundrum that is “caste identity”, and the
foundations of its sustained significance. Studying the origins of the Other
Backward Classes as a reserved group, especially in contrast to the origins of the
Scheduled Castes and Tribes, can be illuminating in this endeavour.

II.

OBC: Category or Identity?

The first form of positive discrimination was introduced by the British
in 1892, when the administration set up separate schools for students from
“Depressed Classes”23. Further, they also instated scholarships (1944), and

22
23

Parkin 2013, 77.
Jaffrelot 2006, 174.
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positions in the civil service (1934, and then raised in 1946)24. “Backward Class”
was first officially used in Mysore (present day Karnataka) in 1918, when the
provincial government appointed a commission to investigate Brahmin over
representation in the administration. By 1921, the province implemented positive
discrimination in administrative recruitment, based on a Backward Class defined
as all castes that were not Brahmin25. Several other states began to use this
classification in the South and West by the mid-1920s, namely Maharashtra and
Madras (present day Tamil Nadu, parts of Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and
Karnataka). The definition of “backward” was refined in these states and in
addition to Brahmins, also excluded “Prabhus, Marwaris, Parsis, Banias, and
Christians”26.
In the Southern provinces, representation for lower castes in politics
was supported in the form of reserved seats in central and provincial legislative
councils as early as 192927. In the North, the evolution of lower-caste
representation only took flight after the freedom movement and the
democratization of Indian politics, around 1947. Many of India’s leaders held
rather idealistic expectations of affirmative action at the time of the
Constitution’s drafting. Ram Manohar Lohia, a Congress leader, argued
vehemently for the role of the “Government [in] allocat[ing] jobs to the lower
castes, and in particular those jobs traditionally the preserve of the upper castes.

24
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Reservations are necessary because the lower castes cannot compete on their
own, perhaps for generations”28. He prioritized the need for lower-caste
reservations in positions of leadership over education, and demanded quotas in
administrative and elected positions29. The logic of using affirmative action to
reduce the significance of the same distinctions upon which affirmative action is
granted seems circular today. However, from Lohia’s perspective, attaining
political and symbolic empowerment was preferred over remaining
marginalized--even if discrimination and implicit biases would still permeate the
system.
A prominent Dalit or “Untouchable” leader, Bhim Rao Ambedkar, who
served as the Chair of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, believed that the
only way caste could be diminished was if lower castes, specifically Scheduled
Castes, rejected Hinduism completely. B.R. Ambedkar urged the British
government to allow for separate electorates for Untouchables in 1930--as had
been granted to Muslims (since 1909)30. This demand was hugely contested and
resisted by most of the Indian National Congress party members--who conceived
of a unified India under the umbrella of the Congress--under Nehru and other
upper caste elite progressives.
Unlike Lohia, Ambedkar believed that educational and professional
reservations were necessary for socio-economic upliftment, and drafted several
provisions in the Constitution to achieve this end. He wanted lower castes to be
28
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30
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treated like a religious minority. Under the Constitution, Sikhs, Muslims,
Christians, and Anglo-Indians are not only afforded proportional representation
in Central and State levels, but also allowed to practice their religions freely with
support from the State under the Fundamental Right to Freedom of Religion31.
With the Communal Award of 1932, certain minorities were to be provided
separate electorates. Ambedkar was in favor of such a mechanism for lower
castes, on the grounds that “he did not trust the majority to elect minority
representatives who would genuinely represent minority interests”32. Gandhi, on
the other hand, only grudgingly approved of separate electorates even for
religious minorities. He believed that reservations were deeply divisive and not
the appropriate means to achieve equality among the castes. He argued fervently
that social change would have to lead the political reforms. Gandhi performed a
hunger strike in response to the Communal Award of 193233, forcing Ambedkar
to concede to a joint electorate for lower castes. Ambedkar’s belief, while in
support of affirmative action, was far more consociational. He did not want the
lower castes to be assimilated into the Hindu majority, but wanted a distinctly
represented minority. Further along this vein, he wanted lower castes to occupy
separate villages completely, and believed a Settlement Commission should be
established for this purpose34.

31
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Several Congress members supported Gandhi, scholars claim largely
because of the upper caste-elite composition of the party at the time, and because
of its large Hindu electoral base35. Congress’ progressive elites believed in a
Socialist sovereign state that would allow for equality under democratic
institutions, free and universal education, mitigation of discrimination: “the
nationalist elite did not promise a classless society, but they did offer the promise
of a casteless society”36. From the 1920s to the time of independence in 1947,
the Congress elite was disproportionately upper caste37, but this leadership
profile began to erode by the 1950s38. Congress originally created ‘vote banks’
by co-opting lower-caste leaders in local talukas or Congress committees in the
1930s39. The vast Congress network allowed for vast representation at the
regional levels, but still created the sense of a glass ceiling at the National level,
which lower-caste Congress members began to resent. Local leaders rose to State
level politics under the Congress, and beat smaller lower-caste opposition
parties,
In India’s first Parliamentary elections in 1951-2, three
opposition parties sought support from the lower castes--the
Peasants’ and Workers’ Party in Bombay, the Dravida
Kazhagam(DK) in Madras, and the Scheduled Caste Federation-

35
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-but Congress defeated all three by a strategy of incorporating
elites from their would-be supporters40
Some leaders were also of the opinion that “[reserved representation] is harmful
in so far as it tends to perpetuate the distinction based on birth”41. K.T. Shah
observed, and foreshadowed, that “the continuance of separate electorates had
led to the evolution of political parties on religious lines rather than economic or
social ideals”42.
Upon independence, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes were
granted reservations, based on the long history of debates and precedent
established. Furthermore, these sub-castes were readily identified based on their
primordial encoding via the Census. However, it was not until 195343 that
Backward Classes were brought to the fore of the reservation debate with the
first national Backward Classes Commission, also referred to as the Kalelkar
Commission after its Chairman Kakasaheb Kalelkar. The original criteria for the
“Socially and Economically Backward Classes” was to be occupation, income,
and education based, but not caste44. However, the commission’s report is
prefaced with an acknowledgement of caste and the “evils that have kept Indian
humanity down”45. The reasons caste was chosen as the unit for classification of
the ostensibly secular backwardness that the commission set out to identify can
40
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be explained partially by “administrative convenience”46, however, as stated by
Kalelkar himself, there were also external factors outside the commission’s
control for the choice.
One problem the commission faced during its research was that
representatives of castes that had once assumed high-caste
names in order to be upgraded in the Census, “now did not
hesitate to give us their original caste names lest they should
lose the State help” Government of India 1956:44).47
Furthermore, Kalelkar himself was left expressing defeat after the publication of
the report, noting that representatives of castes and sub-castes approached the
commission themselves, requesting caste groupings. He was “definitely against
reservations in government services”48 because of several of the commission's
findings, that fastened his fears that “dominant castes from within the backward
classes to corner most benefits”49. With the commission’s inability to create any
other viable classification, the first list of OBCs was constructed of 2,399 subcastes50 which accounted for 32-40 per cent of the nations population at the
time51. The commission report was rejected by Nehru’s “resolutely modernist”52
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socialist government, and the issue of the ‘Socially and Economically Backward
Classes’ was not picked up again until nearly two decades later.
Between the 1960s and 1970s, a national backlash against OBC
reservations mimicking the rejection of the First Backward Classes Commission
report took place at the regional levels. The reasons provided for the repealing of
various state level affirmative action provisions for OBCs were the same as the
ones stated by Nehru’s Home Minister G. B. Pant for rejecting the Kalelkar
report at the national level: “an unconstitutional definition of OBC”53 that
stressed caste distinctions, and that quotas were essentially measures that
disadvantaged those deserving positions based on merit54. In the South, several
states such as Andhra Pradesh (previously Madras) and Kerala had to redesign
reservation policies in order to lower the quota thresholds. However, by the
1970s, the high courts of southern states began defending the quotas, and
reservations not only stabilized, but also began to increase by the mid 1980s. In
the North however, this backlash continued till the 1980s. While several policy,
economic, historic, and geographic variables explain the difference in these
outcomes55, politically, Congress dominance in the North perpetuated the ethos
of Pant’s original criticisms unlike in the South’s more diverse political sphere56.
Furthermore, it also created a political vacuum for an oppositional platform in
favor of OBC reservations.
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By 1978, a Second Backward Classes Commission was appointed on
the national level, referred to as the Mandal Commission after the lower-caste
chairman B. P. Mandal. Unlike the Kalelkar Commission, however, Mandal was
supported by a government in favor of OBC reservations--the Janata Party. The
Janata Party was one that formed to occupy the oppositional vacuum created by
Congress’ historical stance on reservations. Bred on a more extreme socialist
foundation that believed Nehru’s brand of socialism was inadequate and
poisoned with upper caste biases57, the Janata Party elite was mentored by
Lohia’s worldview of affirmative action as an instrument for empowerment58.
The Janata Party was a coalition comprised of several lower-caste parties, each
representing the interests of different and intersectional factions such as farmers,
peasants, socialists, OBCs and some intermediate castes, each of who believed
that “three decades of Congress rule in post-Independence India [were]
essentially elitist and urban oriented”59. By 1980, the Mandal Commission had
released a report, and like the Kalelkar Commission it had identified
backwardness in terms of castes-- 3,743 eligible sub-castes specifically. The
report subscribed explicitly to the role of caste in the traditional social structure,
and rebuked Congress’ proposition that modernization would dilute its
significance. Yet, some members of the commission did express that, like with
the Kalelkar Commission, they had not set out to classify backwardness in terms
of caste but had been demanded to by OBC representatives, noting that “We did
57
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not seek caste [...] caste pursued us”60. The report recommended 27 per cent of
public sector positions to be filled by OBCs, a category which made up 52 per
cent of the population at the time. The report acknowledged the discrepancy in
the proportionality of 27 per cent reservation for 52 per cent of the population,
and explained that the reservations were more symbolic than an actual means to
socio-economic equalization, “the issue was not primarily to improve the
socioeconomic condition of a disenfranchised population, but to make it gain
new confidence in its relationship to power, even to mobilize it politically”61.
However, by 1980 Indira Gandhi’s Congress government had already taken
power, and shelved the report along with its recommendations, thereby
“depriv[ing] herself of OBC support, [and giving] up this trump card to her
opponents62” once again in Congress history.
A decade later, the Janata Dal came to power and under the leadership
of V. P. Singh it brought back to the table the Mandal Commission’s report. The
Janata Dal was comprised of parties representing both peasant politics as well as
affirmative action politics, yet it prioritised the affirmative action politics in
order to gain a stronghold with the OBCs who had been recently mobilized by
the interactions between the Congress and Janata Party63. V. P. Singh announced
in 1990 the Janata Dal’s decision to enact the Mandal Commission’s
recommendations. Within the party, the proponents of peasant politics (largely
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made up of Jats64) were not pleased to have been left out of the reserved castes,
and even resigned from their positions, the most notably, Devi Lal who was the
government’s Deputy Prime Minister65. This announcement was also met with
much protest from upper caste students, with infamous cases of self immolation.
This reaction in turn, provoked a countermobilization organized by the Janata
Dal and fostered support across OBC sub-castes66.
The Mandal Commission, thus, enshrined the sub-castes within the
OBC category with a political identity, “This abstract administrative category,
“the OBCs,” thus acquired political substance not from the inside, but under the
influence of external opposition, by being faced with the Other, the upper
castes”67. However, after the Mandal was passed, competition among OBCs was
created--most notably the castes that had the largest contingencies, there was
“rivalry between major castes such as the Yadavs, the Kurmis, and the Lodhis”68.
Because the category was a synecdoche for several diverse sub-castes, and there
were more eligible sub-castes than reserved, the mobilization during the Mandal
period was short lived.
The most recent reservation for OBCs was passed in 2006, by which
OBCs are now eligible for a 27 per cent quota in higher educational
institutions69. This decision was also met with “determined and vociferous
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resistance” like the previous Mandal recommendations70. Once again,
reservations were being used to pursue goals for which they were specifically
unfit. Higher education presupposes and discriminates on the basis of some level
of previous academic achievements. Previous academic achievement or ‘merit’
is ranked on the basis of applicants’ relative performances on a given
university’s entrance exam. It does not, however, take into consideration that the
performance on the exam is a function of variables such as economic, and social
resources. Given the heterogeneity within the OBCs, and “the fact that some
communities have, through effective political mobilisation, been able to corner a
disproportionate share of state resources”71, reservations in higher education
disproportionately benefit those who are in a position to claim them, a
phenomenon that eerily rings true to Kalelkar’s predictions.

III.

Reconciling Primordialism and Constructivism

Because of the historical basis to caste and sub-caste categories, the
Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe categories have not experienced the same
trajectory as the OBC category. The OBC category, because of its vague
classification, has led to greater political significance of caste, greater demands
for OBC identification, and greater competition over restricted resources (quotas
in this case)72. The broad definition of OBCs has divided groups based on subcaste categories. Rather than the OBCs as a whole seeking revisions in resource
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distributions, it is sub-caste identities (that pre-existed the OBC category) that
are seeking revisions for their specific ingroup, or coalitions of certain groups.
Thus, primordial groupings such as castes were pre-existing identities made
more salient with the constructivist instrument of the reservation and quota
system. It follows that groups with the most resources, either material or more
intangible, will benefit the most from their collective demands than those who
cannot bear the costs of effectively organizing--even if all identify as OBC.
The failure of affirmative action in creating a singular OBC identity,
like the British administration created for caste, is not a complete rebuttal of
constructivism, but a caveat on the applicability of the theory. Institutional
treatment instruments, such as the Census73 or reservations, are effective in
prioritising certain identities; however, the consequent incentives for
identification will revert to pre-existing or hardened systems of stratification.
Thus, “Colonial administration and law at the turn of the century did not create
caste, then, but accentuated it, much as affirmative action accentuates it today”74.
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Chapter 3: The North-South Comparison

Caste distinctions have been, and are still, exploited throughout history and
across geography. In India, caste can be observed to have been mobilized in two
different ways. The first is noted by the esteemed researcher M.N Srinivas as
“sanskritization”, while the other is coined “ethnicization” by Christophe
Jaffrelot. Much of South and West India experienced ethnicization and poses a
contrasting example to the sanskritization of the northern “Hindi Belt” states.
The differences in these mobilizations result largely from historical conditions
and circumstances. While both regions are comparable in size, demographics,
and the presence of caste identities, the resultant disparate trajectories uncover
the distinctions in the characteristics and historical policies of the regions.
These distinct mobilizations had several consequences for the
conception of caste, politics, and affirmative action in the two regions. Some
scholars argue that the OBC term became much more political in the North
because it arrived there later than it did in the South, where it originated75.
However, this is neither the only distinction between the two cases nor the only
explanation. This chapter asserts that in the South, in addition to the fact that the
varna order was dismantled earlier than in the North, the lower-caste
mobilization rallied around a non-Hindu identity that developed into a natural
political identity not burdened by the hierarchy of the varna system. In contrast,
in addition to the delay, the lower-caste mobilization in the North was
75
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incomplete and denied a unifying identity due to dominant-caste co-optation and
countermobilization. The identity granted to lower castes in the North,
specifically OBCs, was reactive and born in response to such
countermobilizations, while being encumbered with political salience.
Eventually in the North and in the South, affirmative action was granted on the
basis of politicized caste identities76, but in the South the “backward classes”
were identified from the legacy of the lower-caste identity, whereas in the North
they were identified based on the political mobilization by elites, more prone to
dominant-caste manipulation77. While it is not certain if the North will follow
exactly the trajectory of the South, as many have theorized that the HinduMuslim divide looms larger, the sanskritized mobilization of the northern lowercastes will determine whether their new political identity will be able to
withstand Hindu-nationalist co-optation or be overwhelmed to assimilate: “By
implication as well as intention, Hindu nationalism stands for Hindu unity, not
for caste consciousness. Lower-caste parties are against Hindu unity”78.

I.

Sanskritization

The Varna system ranks castes on the basis of ritual purity—as denoted
by the practice of traditions associated with holiness. Brahmins shower a certain
number of times a day, groom a particular way, follow specific diets, and pray in
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a precise manner. Castes below the top Brahmins traditionally do not follow all
the rituals, or as strictly, and decreasingly so down the pyramid. Sanskritization
is used to define the trend where lower-caste communities switch their lifestyles
to mimic those of the upper castes’. Turning vegetarian, praying or visiting
temples more ardently, and the observance of habits traditionally stereotyped as
Brahmin are some of the changes that mark the process scholars today note as
Sanskritization. As Srinivas aptly points out, “[t]he rules of caste behavior are
rules of religion”79. Sanskritization is not only the superficial observance of
greater ritual purity—it is a motivated attempt to be considered more devout and
therefore conforming into the “fold of Hindu civilization”. For those who are
traditionally considered outcasts, Sanskritization is a mode of assimilation into
the system instead of remaining marginalized, and moreover, “The adoption of
vegetarianism, teetotalism, and Sanskritization enables a low caste to rise in
status in course of time”80.
In the ‘Hindi Belt’ (primarily considered Uttar Pradesh, Madhya
Pradesh, Bihar, and Rajasthan), Jaffrelot points to the cases of Yadavs (Shudras)
and Chamars (Untouchables). The Yadavs’ origins, like those of several groups
in India, are based on unsubstantiated reports. While the group would have been
ideal for an ethnicization based mobilization, due to their connection to the Arya
Samaj, “the Yadav movement remained imbued with the ethos of
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Sanskritization”81. The first record of the origins of the Yadavs, titled The Divine
Heritage of the Yadavs, was written by Kithal Krishna Khedekar and his son
R.V. Khedekar, and published in 1959. This account illustrates the Yadavs as a
ruling dynasty of Aryan origin--thus giving the Yadavs an ethnic identity, but
one “embedded in the Sanskritization logic”82. Similarly, the Jatav movement
claimed descent for Chamars from the ‘Yadu’ race of Kshatriyas. The
movement’s notable leaders were Swami Manikchand Jatavaveer and Sunderlal
Sagar. With a connection to the Arya Samaj, schools and other institutions set up
by them taught the Chamars of Agra about these fictive histories of origin from
the Yadu race.83
Another group of Untouchables that mobilized an identity within the
notion of Sanskrit hierarchy were the Adi-Hindus. The identity conceptualized
the Untouchables as the original inhabitants or the autochthonous people of
India. While similar to a tribal or Dravidian notion of identity, in terms of
religion the Adi-Hindus still preached within a Hindu bhakti framework rather
than a pre-Hindu religion. The leader, Achutanand, left the Arya Samaj and
started the bhakti inspired movement through monastic orders and sabhas. This
movement tried to improve the standing of Untouchables within the Hindu social
order, because it did not reject caste or revoke Hinduism. Instead, the AdiHindus tried to engage upper castes and reject only the notion of caste hierarchy.
Adi-Hindus achieved moderate to no success, communicating their messages
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with practices such as inter-caste dining ceremonies, that were looked down
upon by upper castes84.
These lower-caste movements in the North attempted to create distinct
identities for themselves, but failed to emancipate their respective marginalized
sub-castes from the varna logic. A recurring interruption in the path of these
movements was the Arya Samaj’s active “repurification” conversion campaigns
to end untouchability. Arya Samaj is an organization that was born out of the
perceived threat of Muslims and Christians “proselytizing the Hindu race” with
the “Hindu fold becoming narrower day by day”85. Repurification or Shuddhi
operates, to this day, on the belief that Hindus are a race and India is a Hindu
nation. Any conversion to other religions were, and still are, considered only
temporary. Around the turn of the 19th century, with larger numbers of lowercastes converting to either Islam or Christianity due to the marginalization within
Hinduism, the Arya Samaj manipulated and intensified its practice of shuddhi, so
that it “now included social promotion, having nothing to do with religious
conversion as understood in a Christian or Islamic sense”86.These religions were
especially threatening in that the Arya Samaj believed that they were specifically
targeting the large masses of lower-castes.
He [the religious leader, Swami Dayanand] explained that crores of
people had become Musalmans or were being converted to
Christianity and unless the nation was aroused by candid advice
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and unless the society was purged of evils, there was little doubt
that the Hindu race would die87.
The Arya Samaj led mass conversions in the name of repurifying the
untouchables and Shudras, largely in the late 19th century, “In 1893 the Shuddhi
Sabha (Purification Council) was set up as a joint enterprise between Sikhs and
Aryas and as the first association for organised reconversion, followed by
numerous other councils”88. Dayanand, the founder’s, justification for this was
that, “A Brahman can become untouchable if he is not clean. On the other hand a
Shudra can become touchable if he is clean. He held ‘ it is cleanliness which
removes untouchability’ ”89. This form of co-optation by organized upper Hindu
groups not only prevented and delayed the lower-caste mobilizations, but it also
conveniently distorted group narratives so that past upper caste discrimination
was not acknowledged and even normalized. In “repurifying” lower castes for
the security of the “Hindu race”, sanskritization effectively snatched away, via
the mechanism of shuddhi, the possibility of a lower-caste identity in the North.
It created fluidity in the identities of these sub-castes to make them more
responsive to immediate incentives, rather than establishing an identity based on
the shared experiences and acknowledgment of marginalization.
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II.

Ethnicization

Jaffrelot describes ethnicization as the trend in caste mobilization that
took place in the Southern states. He asserts that apart from the physical
concessions, sub-castes also experienced a shift in the conceptualization of caste.
The five parameters to caste mobilization—crafting a strong identity, leadership,
institutionalization, communication, and political opportunity—were satisfied in
the ethnicization of caste in the South and the West. The concept of caste identity
as an ethnic bond was consolidated in European Orientalist ideas,
ethnicization […] in West and South India was largely due to the
impact of the European ideas, as propagated by the missionaries […]
British Orientalism gave purely racial connotations to caste and
linguistic groups in the 19th century[…] equated ‘Aryans’ with the
upper castes and the Dravidians with the lowest orders of the Indian
society90
The ethnicization, or substantialization91, process was founded on an intellection
of lower castes as a “pre-Aryan” identity. While one faction, under the
leadership of Jotirao Phule (Shudra), subscribed to a racial notion of lower-caste
unity for “non-Brahmins at large”, the other faction—under B. R. Ambedkar—
believed, and tried to craft a Buddhist-Dalit identity. Phule institutionalized his
lower-caste identity in Maharashtra by setting up schools specifically for lower
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castes (1853) and by founding the Satyashodak Samaj (1873)92, that crystallized
into a unified bahujan samaj (untouchable movement). Ambedkar on the other
hand, focused on specifically Dalits 93. He immortalized his historical theories,
sociological analyses, and aims for Dalits in his book The Untouchable: Who
Were They and Why They Became Untouchables, and in the Constitution via his
role as the chairman of the Drafting Committee. Both factions of the
ethnicization ideology understood the mechanism of Sanskritization as a function
of internalizing inferiority in the lower castes--while disabling them from uniting
by dividing them--in an artificial social system that compared all others to an
arbitrary superior, thus perpetuating its superiority and their inferiority. They
strove to create an alternative identity that was not validated by the unjust caste
system.
The institutionalization of ‘pre-Aryan’ and ‘Buddhist-Dalit’
conceptions of lower-caste identity were communicated widely across the West
and South, furthering the ethnicization of caste. In the South, the synthesis of
Phule and Ambedkar’s ideologies was manifest in the Dravidian-Buddhist ‘SelfRespect Movement’, led by Ramaswami Naicker, respectfully referred to as
Periyar. It established political roots with the formation of the political party
Dravidar Kazhagam (DK) in 1944, and mobilized a Christian, Muslim, and
lower-caste coalition through its publication Viduthalai94. Lower-caste
representation in legislative assemblies, and the push to replace offensive terms
92

Jaffrelot 2000b, 759.
Jaffrelot 2000b, 763.
94
Jaffrelot 2000b, 761.
93

35

with self-claimed names in State records95, created a shared sentiment among the
pan-Dravidian against Brahmin supremacy in the Madras presidency.

III.

Enabling circumstances

Several competing and interacting factors explain the delayed identity formation
in the North, as compared to that in the South. While both regions remain
politicized today, the interaction of historical patterns of land tenure, the role of
the British Census, and relations with the British administration can explain how
the ethnicized identity of South India’s lower castes was far more politicized,
and much earlier than the sanskritized identity of the North’s lower castes.
A. Land tenure systems
Jaffrelot notes that the different tax collection approaches in the North
and South sowed the cultural seeds for different interactions with the state and
authority. In the North, the zamindari system was widespread, marked by the
collection of taxes by a rent-seeking middleman or middle-men, “As zamindars,
they formed a rentier class and a large section of them were absentee landlords,
living far away from the site of production”96. The middleman, or zamindar, was
a position first instituted during the decline of the Mughal empire. It was a
hereditary post, and the descendants of Mughal zamindars continued to be the
local tax collection authorities under the British empire. With this form of
revenue farming, the British recognized the zamindar as the landlord, which
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already created a level between those who cultivated the land and those who
collected property taxes. Because zamindari estates could expand over more than
one district, several zamindars would lease out their tax collection
responsibilities for portions of land to another level of zamindars, who each took
a portion of the taxes for themselves97. As the number of intermediaries would
increase, the tax amount a peasant tenant would have to pay would also increase
in order to relay the same tax amount to the state. The actual cultivators
practically became mere tenants on what was once their own land98. This nested
hierarchy mirrored the Varna system, and was interrelated in its segregation by
caste as well, “landowners invariably belonged to the [...] upper castes, the
cultivators to the middle castes and the agricultural workers to the lowest castes,
a situation that led to economic disabilities being aggravated by social
disadvantages”99.
The Mughal empire was not as powerful in the South, and so the
zamindari system was not as widely practiced100. When the British began
administering the regions, it focused on entering into direct agreements with
peasants unbound by the zamindari system, who were concentrated “particularly
in the south and the west”101. As a consequence, in the South and West, the
raiyatwari or ryotwari system was prevalent, which was characterized by “no
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intermediary between the landholders and the government.”102 Landholders
under this system lent out most of their land, in a peasant-proprietor fashion103.
In the South, unlike the North, it was normal for lower castes to interact with
authority. Furthermore, because cultivation was not segregated by castes, it
subverted hierarchical ritual structures for occupational egalitarianism
B.

Demographics

The Census, a governance tool for the British administration, laid out all
the castes and their associated descriptions, at the end of the 19th century. The
distinctions drawn in the Census itself, have been a prism with several sides
subject to speculation. The historical intentions of Colonial administrators who
drew up some of the first national Censuses of India (earliest of which was
drafted in 1872) have been interpreted as innocently misguided (N. Peabody104),
as biased to favor Brahmins (D. Gupta105), or as a means of achieving
administrative efficiency and furthering the British policy of ‘Divide and Rule’
(R.B. Bhagat106). Some argue that this transformed caste from an abstract set of
descent-based attributes to real associations that functioned like interest
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groups107. The notion of ethnic identity as a pressure group was formalized when
the British began using caste categories, based on their stereotyping in the
Census, to fulfill specific roles within the administration. For example, upper
caste ‘Brahmins’ were considered the most educated and intellectual—so they
were given higher posts as compared to the ‘Shudras’, who were given menial
positions:
The data put together by the Madras government in 1912 showed
that, at the higher levels of government service where Indians were
employed, Brahmins made up 55 per cent of Deputy Collectors [...]
The analysis of caste composition among those employed in 1917 in
the Revenue and Judicial departments as tahsildars, deputy
tahsildars, English head clerks, sharistadars of district and sub-courts
reinforces very much the same conclusion108
The use of caste-based qualifications as a form of vetting for positions was
instituted with reservations or “quotas” in the civil services, legislative
assemblies, and educational institutions. This role of sub-castes as pressure
groups also evolved in that members would petition for higher rankings as an
affirmation of their groups’ social standing,
Each census provided castes with an opportunity to petition the
government for getting a higher place in the order of precedence
and for being recorded under new, sanskritised, names. Indeed, this
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move was in keeping with the logic of sanskritisation since the
objective was not to opt out from the system but to rise within it
according to its own rules and values.109
Others claim that before the Census imposed primordialist definitions of discrete
ethnic identities centered around the Brahmanical subscription to the Varna
system, caste associations formed “'fuzzy' communities [that] were indistinct
groups with neither internal cohesion nor well known externalities and [...] were
communities without overt communication”110. Gupta, notably, denies that
“caste itself is a colonial creation,”111 but concedes that Colonial interpretation
and enumeration of caste significantly altered its function in daily life, and
subsequently politics.
A second function of the Census was the revelation of caste
demographics in the North and the South. While the North had a higher
proportion of upper caste Hindus in the total population, the South had fewer and
less clear of a caste gradation: “in Tamil Nadu Brahmins account[ed] for only 3
percent of the population whereas they constitute[d] almost ten percent in Uttar
Pradesh (a state where the upper castes altogether represent[ed] one-fifth of
society”112. This clear numerical dominance of upper castes in the North allowed
for organizations like the Arya Samaj to firstly, exist and be largely supported;
secondly, organize and change the narrative of minority communities through
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practices like mass shuddhi; and thirdly, to normalize the inferiority of lower
castes. In the South, with only individual cases of Brahmin discrimination, the
lower castes had a clear opponent and did not have to face early movement cooptation or future large scale upper-caste countermobilizations.
C.

British Administration

British “compensatory discrimination” towards lower-caste coalitions,
such as the Justice Party in Madras, has been viewed in light of several plausible
explanations. Irschick presents three understandings, that could all function in
congruity and to varying degrees. First, the Indian Civil Service (I.C.S) was
genuinely trying to exercise a British understanding of social justice and equalize
the representation of lower-castes in the social, educational, political, and
economic spheres of Madras113. Second, the I.C.S was especially threatened by
the ostensible Brahmin dominance of the government services114. Lastly, it was
an intentional form of ‘Divide and Rule’ policy, where the British administration
actively nurtured anti-Brahmin movements with statutory representation as a
counter to the Brahmin-elite Congress that was actively calling for ‘Home
Rule’115. Ram argues that it was only the third116, while Gough asserts it was the
first, and that anti-Brahmin groups were merely inspired by the British attempt at
“communal representation”117. While all are potential explanations for the
British compensatory discrimination, one certain consensus among scholars is
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that the non-Brahmin movement in Madras had roots in a lower-caste ethnicized
identity, and was thus able to capitalize on the political opportunities presented.
This in turn created a mutually regenerative relationship between the British
administration and the lower castes. The British could pursue their policy of
compensatory discrimination for state building, while the lower castes could
unite under the Dravidian identity to lobby for common interests118.
With Brahmins as the common enemy for South Indian lower castes and
the British administration, a symbiotic dynamic where lower-castes were
especially active in lobbying and pressuring the British government for
concessions was created119: “the non-Brahmins asked for more seats in the
Madras assembly because they were ‘different’”120. As early as 1920, the Justice
League was able to win Tamil Nadu elections on the basis of the lower-caste
mobilized identity: “their leaders requested ‘all non-Brahmins in this presidency
to immediately organize, combine and carry on an active propaganda so as to
ensure [...] Council of as many non-Brahmins as possible’ ”121. This was a direct
manifestation of a politicized identity for lower castes, based on non-Hindu
interpretations of their ethnic origins.
In the North, however, such a relationship was not feasible. Politically,
the most prominent parties were largely occupied by upper castes. The
independence struggle and the nationalist movement remained entrenched in the
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idea of a united India, and was largely led by upper castes. This strategy was
effective in divorcing Indian nationality from British colonialism, but it muted
the caste differences and the sub-national identities to create a united front.
These movements and political parties were segregated as well, “Most politicians
came from the upper castes, and many leaders were trained abroad. Lower down
the political hierarchy, an agrarian and "vernacular" elite dominated local and
state politics (Weiner 1962), but even the lower-level political leadership tended
to come from the upper castes in North India”122. Regional parties and successful
lower-caste coalitions were largely absent from the political arenas of the
northern states, until after independence and the framing of the Constitution.

IV.

Distinctions

In the South and parts of the West, regional non-Brahmin movements
like those in Tamil Nadu, Assam, and Punjab, etc. led to the formation of parties
like the Dravida Kazhagam as early as in 1944123. In contrast, the Hindi Belt’s
first few broad based lower-caste parties only took form in the 1950-60s, and
could not sustain themselves lastingly or politically, largely due to the “inability
to coalesce within caste federations or even caste fronts, as the loose and
ephemeral crystallisation of the OBC coalition testified”124. Furthermore, lowercastes in the South found it beneficial to change their higher rank in the Census
to identify as backward with the intent of qualifying for affirmative action as
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early as in the 1920’s125. In contrast, sub-castes in the North only began making
these claims when the Kalelkar Commission began its task of creating a
backward classes list in the 1960s126. Today, the effects of the South’s stronger
mobilization are clearly visible, “Tamil Nadu reserves the largest percentage of
civil service positions, with nearly four-fifths of the civil service posts subject to
quotas”127; and this has created problematic incentives, “so much so that the state
has a cottage industry of fake caste certificates for Brahmins seeking to pass
themselves off as Dalits, formerly known as untouchables”128.
Sanskritization and ethnicization differ from each other at a very
fundamental level. Sanskritization mobilized lower castes to internalize their
inferiority, whereas ethnicization made them question the very basis of their
subscription to such a system. These two mobilizations also differ in their
occurrence and consequences. While Sanskritization created a fractured group of
intermediate castes, ethnicization created a politically active and resilient nonBrahmin identity. Furthermore, the result of sanskritization was only observed as
a trend post-independence, and after the framing of affirmative action in the
Constitution, as a temporary response to Mandal and then to the upper caste
countermoblization. Ethnicization was in motion as early as in the 1920s, and the
arena of pressure groups by that era was already far more evolved. Furthermore,
Ethnicization was largely a complete and broad based mobilization, whereas
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Sanskritization was relatively stunted because of organized upper caste cooptation.
The movements were the results of a combination of historical,
demographic, and policy interventions. Because of the hierarchical structure of
the Zamindari system, the upper castes’ numerical dominance, representation of
more gradations of the varna, and the nationalist integration of lower castes by
the Congress, the conditions in the Hindi Belt were not conducive for a lowercaste emancipation. In the South, however, the presence of a more egalitarian
Ryotwari system, relatively fewer numbers and types of upper castes, and
symbiotic anti-Brahmin support in return British compensatory discrimination
collectively created a lower-caste identity ready to represent itself without upper
caste domination.
Across North, South and West India, caste became a unifier, and caste
associations were transformed from an abstract concept of occupational
stratification into a tangible means to a material end. Further, the role of
authority in defining the stratification—in this case, first by the prevailing land
tenure systems, then by the documentation in the Census, and later by the
interactions with the British administration—plays a significant role in molding a
tradition of approaching through, for example, lobbying via interest groups, the
appropriate authority for joint concessions. In the South and West, this preceded
OBC affirmative action concessions in the Mandal Commission. In the North, it
was in response to them. As a result, today, “students from south India and other
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states with a long history of affirmative action and a strong backward caste
movement are much better placed to take advantage of this scheme”129.
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Chapter 4:
Politicization of Caste and Implications for Affirmative Action

Evidence for a theory can be discerned in several ways. Looking at a particular
outcome, the features or characteristics of its occurrence become indicators of its
prevalence. These features can be marked as evidence for a particular theory.
Thus, in discerning if the practice of affirmative action for OBCs have been
distorted from their original intention, the features of the outcome must be
separated from the explanations. This chapter examines a key explanation for the
divergence of the reservation system from its original intention, the politicization
of caste, while trying to gather evidence for the outcome. Specifically, the first
section will theorize why the politicization of caste is a distortion of the original
intention of affirmative action; the second section will analyze the strategic
motivations behind political actors and voters engaging in such politicization;
and the third section will identify the evidence for such politicization and
implied distortion.

I. Politicization as a distortion
Why is politicization of caste a distortion of the original intention of
affirmative action, and not just an extension of its application? To answer this
question, first the definition of politicization is important. Caste in India has not
declined in everyday significance, however, its manifestation has completely
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transformed from what it was originally theorized as in Hindu philosophy, i.e.
what it lost in orthodoxy it has evolved in orthopraxy. It has entered and thrived
in the political arena, with separate political parties representing one or more
castes or caste groups--i.e. ethnic parties. Further, ascriptive voting is a viable
strategy of both, voter mobilization for elites, and representation for voters. The
mobilization and construction of castes as political identities have created an
efficient grouping mechanism without real ideological significance130--much like
ethnic interest groups.
Such politicization of caste has far reaching consequences on India’s
political, social, and economic spaces. One consequence is the arbitrary
expansion of affirmative action, specifically the distortion of channels for groups
to seek it, and the basis for authorities to grant it. Ideally, claims for reservations
would be evaluated on legal grounds, with courts as the “keepers of the sluice
gates”131, given the responsibility of determining which groups are eligible to
qualify for reservations, in addition to the groups enumerated in the original
OBC list, as per the criteria delineated. Alternatively, bureaucratic systems
should automatically include groups eligible when they meet the criteria, and
graduate those who have surpassed the identified thresholds. However, with the
politicization of caste, such channels of appeal are replaced by direct electoral
negotiations between political entrepreneurs and voters.
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Further, a fundamental objective for reservations was to reduce caste
distinctions by equalizing the backward groups. Using reservations as a “token”
for elections creates incentives to divide along ethnic lines, and to claim benefits
for ethnic groups. This makes caste more significant in citizens’ psyches. This
does not remove caste barriers, but aggravates their everyday salience. Instead of
mobilizing along lines of economic and political ideology, voters mobilize along
lines of caste132, and increasingly religion. This in turn reinforces the role of
caste in determining economic and political ideologies. Where caste used to
determine occupations and status, it now determines which elite or party is
elected. Instead of elite or party ideology representing the voters’ ideology, the
elite or party’s caste represents voters’ ethnicity. Thus, democracy’s model of
elites or parties representing the interests of the majority is de-legitimized, as the
minimum winning coalition is now determined by majority identity. Castes with
largest demographics are then ensured to win elections: “a politics of ethnic head
counting appears to subvert democratic competition by producing predetermined
results based on ethnic demography”133.

II. Mechanisms that explain the distortion
Much has been published about the role and significance of caste in
Indian politics. Affirmative action in India, since its inception, has not
exclusively reserved educational and occupational opportunities. It has also
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embraced an emancipation agenda, by reserving political representation for
Scheduled Castes and Tribes, among other minorities. Some may argue this
provision in itself is the reason for the politicization of caste, and by extension
affirmative action. For OBCs specifically, the first round of reservations was
offered only for public service posts. Thus, there appears to be a more complex
and evolving interplay that explains such a politicization, stemming from
patronage politics, ethnic favoritism, pressure groups, and modes of lobbying.
While there are several obstacles in the efficient functioning of ideal
channels for granting reservations, such as jurisdiction or bureaucracy, in low
information, resource poor, infrastructure lacking, developing nations like India-the politicization of caste is not one. In fact, the politicization of caste is a motive
for elites, and a rational path for voters. It makes instrumentally rational sense to
voters and elites to mobilize as castes134. This theory lies on the logic of
politicians being beholden to their voters for election and reelection in
democracies. With a politicized debate topic such as reservations, candidates are
able to immediately mobilize specific target groups of their voter base by 1)
espousing expansion of reservation for particular castes, 2) promising to avoid
withdrawing reservations from particular castes, or similarly 3) avoiding denying
claims for reservations. For voters, organizing as a group to demand reservations
is seen as the best path to receive them, because 1) separating themselves from
outsiders will make them more identifiable for when benefits are to be
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distributed135, 2) the denial of demands would be met with a loss of votes for
that politician or party from an entire group--not just an individual or family, and
3) the future threat of reservations being withdrawn can be met with the future
threat of votes being withheld. In addition to the instrumental rationale for
voting, scholars assert that voters “affirm a psychic allegiance” with their caste,
party, or preferred incumbent when voting expressively136. This expressive
rationale was intentionally pursued in the Mandal Commission’s report:
When a backward class candidate becomes a Collector or a
Superintendent of Police, the material benefits accruing from
his position are limited to the members of his family only. But
the psychological spin off of this phenomenon is tremendous;
the entire community of that backward class candidate feels
socially elevated137
While it could be argued that this is not unique to caste, and that this
interaction occurs in any democracy with ideology as well, it is important to
inject in this line of thought the distinction between the two. Caste, unlike
ideology, is a constructed identity that is superficially encased in primordial
fictions of immutable and hereditary characteristics. Ideology, while potentially
correlated with hereditary characteristics, is mutable and ideally determined by
opinions based on facts, biased by worldviews, and hardened by experiences.
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This distinction renders the politicization of caste especially noxious for the
reservation system in India.
Kanchan Chandra’s research points out that in an ethnically divided
context, like India, both instrumental as well as expressive voting is indeed on
the basis of caste138. Caste is used as a heuristic in low-information settings to
favor co-ethnics for delivering on promises, resulting in a “self-enforcing and
reinforcing equilibrium of ethnic favoritism”139. Osborne supports the notion of
caste as the primary grouping classification, citing efficiency in formation140. For
a pressure group to direct the most benefits from its influence towards ingroup
members, it must be able to exclude the outgroup and identify the ingroup. While
almost any unifying feature can be used to create such a pressure group, the
variable that determines which ones are created is the marginal transaction costs.
Most nations have historically observed pressure groups along lines of economic
activity due to the relatively low marginal transactions costs associated with
organizing individuals who work and engage in business together141. India’s
caste structure was primed for such pressure group formation due to the low
associated marginal transactions costs142.
These theories are especially applicable for the case of the OBCs, who
were wooed by the opposition as a response to the strong upper-caste resistance
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to affirmative action measures143, “Due to the deadlock situation, OBC
populations in northern India became particularly important for opposition
parties [...] Their efforts evolved into a strategy that boiled down to using quotas
both as a political tool and as a lever for social advancement”144.

III. Evidence of a distorted mandate
The politicization of caste, and consequently affirmative action, is one
explanation for the distortion of reservations’ original mandate. The evidence, or
features of the outcome, are varied and related. This section will examine the
timing and frequency of reservations being debated and offered, the voting
behavior of the OBCs, and a general evaluation of the social welfare impacts of
reservation policy to identify the larger public policy significance of such a
malfunction in the invocation function. The timing of reservations, and when
elites offer them, are crucial in this examination. For affirmative action to be
used as an electoral “token” there must be an observed spike in its mention and
offers around the time of elections. Jaffrelot notes this trend of increases in
reservation debates and importance coinciding with the time of elections145.
Similar claims were made by Mr. Venugopal, the senior counsel who argued in
the Mandal case, that “in Tamil Nadu before every election there happens to be
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an addition of one or two castes in the list of backward class to secure vote of a
particular caste en bloc”146.
Secondly, the frequency and channel for the addition or removal of
additional castes to the OBC list is another point of examination. While adding
castes to the Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes list is tedious (albeit not
impossible), Osborne notes that this is not so for the OBCs, “Once a president
issues a list for each state, only an act of parliament can change it [...] such
safeguards as exist for SCs and STs are absent for the third category of Indians
eligible for reservations, the ‘Other Backward Classes’ (OBCs)”147. Further, Mr.
Venugopal added in his argument that the OBC list has seen a progressive
increase in the number of castes it deems eligible from 1,373 in 1950, 2,399 in
1955, 3,763 in 1980, to 5,013 as of 2006148. This increase has taken place in a
context where a complete list of all Indian castes does not exist to circumscribe
the OBC list. Moreover, he indicated that “to this day not a single caste has been
removed from the backward caste list”149.
Further, the voting behavior of the OBCs, and the appeals to which they
respond are essential in this analysis as well. If there exists value in maintaining
caste distinctions for those in power, the opposition, and the castes themselves,
caste distinctions will continue to exist. This value is hypothesized as being
similar to that of a pressure group for ingroup members, and as provocative

146

The Hindu 2007a
Osborne 2001, 664.
148
The Hindu 2007a.
149
Ibid
147

54

election rhetoric for political entrepreneurs and opposition. The existence of
parties dedicated to serving specific castes, or using caste and sub-caste alliances
as party ideology is evidence of this. Ram Manohar Lohia, the father of the
“empowerment” agenda150, fell prey to a monster of his own creation. As part of
his empowerment policy, several of his party members in the SSP were OBCs.
However, “after the elections, Bindeshwari Prasad Mandal, [...] defected and
formed the Shoshit Dal, "the party of the oppressed" with forty lower-caste MLA
dissidents from different sides, including the SSP”151. Further evidence of the
political employment of caste lies in the electoral alliances between sub-castes
and castes traditionally considered opponents. In 2007 the Bahujan Samajwadi
Party was the first to win a clear majority in the legislative assembly without a
coalition government, since 1993. This was largely due to the fact that no party
could attract votes from all the OBCs of Uttar Pradesh, consistent with the
treatment of the designation as “an official meta-category in Northern India”
rather than a community152. Mayawati, a Jatav who is the leader of the BSP,
achieved this success by mobilizing the traditional voter base of the party, i.e. the
Dalits, along with the Brahmins of Uttar Pradesh153, lower OBCs and muslims:
“In 2007, every sixth Brahmin in UP voted for the BSP”154. This strategy was
coined as a “sandwich coalition”, “because it is a coalition of the top-bottom of
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the society and traps all other social denominations in-between”155. This
particular sandwich coalition mobilized Brahmins and Dalits, the two ends of the
varna system, for successful political ends, made especially ironic because
Mayawati and the BSP have both actively idolized B.R. Ambedkar and claim to
represent the Dalits in-line with his philosophy. Politically, the BSP shifted and
tailored its slogans and performance in order to attract the upper caste Hindu
votes, with Mayawati deciding to delay her conversion to Buddhism in 2016 to
after the 2017 assembly elections. Further, a lower-caste party maintaining a proHindu stance in UP is not as onerous, because of the prevailing sanskritization
ethos156: the fact that “more than 90 percent of Dalits in Uttar Pradesh are
willfully continuing as Hindus even in face of oppression at the hands of upper
castes and other backward communities”157, and the belief that “Dalits owe their
existence to Manuwad and Vedic Hinduism”158. This caste basis to party
ideology has developed, and today research also notes the “appropriation of
Dalit-Bahujans and Shudras by Hindutva groups [which] is strategic to [parties’]
political and nationalist agendas”159. In a 2016 speech in Delhi, Prime Minister
Modi claimed to be a follower of B.R. Ambedkar, and mentioned that
“Reservation is [lower castes’] right and nobody can snatch it from them”160.
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Moreover, caste members voting along caste lines is evidence of
ingroup members finding value in maintaining these distinctions. Kanchan
Chandra’s research of patronage politics in play at the village and regional levels
attests to rational motivations to vote for co-ethnics161. This theory has been
challenged by newer models and data that suggest party loyalties as superior
motivations162. Data on ethnic parties and multi-ethnic parties have indicated,
however, that patronage politics is still applicable for narrowly defined ethnic
parties. It is the “‘encompassing ethnic parties’ [that] increased non-elite voter
autonomy and looked to replace elite-centered winning coalitions with broadly
defined ethnic ones”163. In the example of the BSP’s 2007 sandwich coalition,
Mayawati was able to mobilize different groups by offering election slates and
candidacies strategically; specifically, “its strategy of giving tickets to 110 OBCs
paid rich dividends and a massive +43 percentage points shift of the caste group
towards BSP was discernible (jats + 13, yadavs +2, kurmis +6, lodhs +7, other
OBCs + 15)”164. Similarly it offered 61 seats to Muslim candidates, garnering 17
per cent of the Muslim vote, which resulted in 28 of the candidates winning.
The last piece of conclusive evidence lies in the evaluation of the
performance of the affirmative action program by analyzing its social welfare
consequences. For affirmative action to have been invoked faithfully to its
original mandate, the socio-economic and literacy levels among identified
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groups should improve, leading to some equalization. Had there been political
manipulation of the invocation, a rise in caste-based political groups should be
observed--as evidenced in the sections above. V.P. Singh himself acknowledged
in his decision to adopt the Mandal recommendations that the number of posts
offered was neither proportionate to the number of eligible aspirants, nor were
these posts a significant portion of the job market, “the Government jobs account
for only one per cent and out of this one per cent if one fourth is given to anyone,
it cannot be a course for this economic betterment though it may have some
effect”165. For him it was a political program to breed a base of voters along a
political OBC identity that was being protected by the ethnic party: “Of the
204,288 appointments that had been made in the bureaucracy in 1988, 55,158
jobs would have been given to OBCs [...] the bureaucracy was shrinking, with
the number of posts declining from 226,781 in 1985 to 204,288 in 1988”166.
Political and psychological empowerment, however, are not equivalent to
educational and economic empowerment that are the key mechanisms for the
foundation of the equalizing rationale behind affirmative action.
For the social welfare and upliftment objectives of reservations to have
been actually met, the reserved seats must be scrutinized on the basis of whether
they are being filled at all, and the hurdles in filling them if they not. Seats going
unfilled is a negative for both parties involved--the reserved because they are not
experiencing the benefits of the affirmative action for which they are eligible, the
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unreserved groups because they now experience a post reservation level of
higher competition despite the reserved seats not being occupied by either
classification of applicants. Research indicates that there exists a pattern of
reserved seats in higher education often going unfilled. This points towards some
fault in the mechanisms of either lower-caste applications, or institutions
judgments of merit. The latter can be explained as a function of a lower value of
lower-caste applicants, and some perceptions of lower value of lower castes, i.e.
prejudice. The two are, in fact, interrelated and self-perpetuating. Because lower
castes do face and have been facing prejudice for centuries, data now supports
the claim that, “Reserving seats to lower-caste applicants might reduce the
returns on the investment made in engineering colleges”167. Furthermore, reports
of reserved seats not being filled by reserved category students, or going
unfilled, have also become material for politicization in the past168.
The former can be explained largely due to the stigma in the minds of
the lower castes that prevents them from claiming there places in these public
spaces that have largely been within the realm of the upper castes. Those at the
bottom of the social structure are not affected by stigma as much as those of high
or middle social status, as the threat of downward social mobility does not exist
for the lowest like it does for the middle or high. Khamis illustrated this rationale
with his 2012 research, that quantified such social anxiety for OBCs. On
average, OBCs spend eight per cent more on observable consumption than upper
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caste Hindus169. Following this logic, Gille hypothesized that rates of applicants
from OBC communities would be lower than for lower groups. He found a
significant relationship between the land assets of a family and the probability of
a student of that particular sub-caste applying for reserved seats, and moreover,
“When the jati is dominant in the village, the application rate of households
belonging to this jati is lower than when the same jati is not dominant”170. This is
especially surprising, considering that the OBCs who claim backwardness and
demand reservations--i.e. are not already on the list of OBC groups, and must
debate their case--are usually dominant castes. The occurrence of groups not
making use of reserved seats in higher education, yet demanding them from
states is evidence that these demands for reservations are not about education at
all. While “it is clear that there is something in the gate-keeping mechanism
which regulates entry into higher education that makes it discriminate in favor of
the "upper" and against the "lower" castes”171, there is also the role of
politicization of affirmative action in explaining the incentive to demand state
resources--especially so for a heterogeneous coalition like the OBCs.
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Chapter 5: Dominant Castes and Claims to Reservations

Placing the Brahmins as the sole apex of the “Hindu polity” illustrates an
incomplete impression of the caste system and its implications. While the
Brahmins may be held as superior in spiritual terms, the political and economic
roles played by other “dominant castes” have a more significant role in today’s
Indian village.
M.N. Srinivas introduced the concept of a more “dominant caste”, and
its importance in influencing the rules within which rural life is practiced--in so
far as it is not a lower caste. He outlined seven key factors, “numerical
superiority, economic status, political power, ritual status, non-traditional
education, modern occupation, and physical force”172, as definitive of a dominant
caste--which may be represented by one or more locale specific jatis. In this
definition, Srinivas’ categories encapsulate ascriptive, “achievementoriented”173, and situational factors. Ascriptive factors here include ritual status
and economic status--as asset or land ownership plays a key role in the
subjective position of a caste or subcaste in a given rural setting. Non-traditional
or modern education and employment are categorized by T. K. Oomen as
“achievement-oriented” attributes. In contemporary India, these achievementoriented characteristics interact with ascriptive factors--as is evident in the
application of affirmative action policies. Situational or circumstantial factors
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include numerical strength (which depends on demography), and physical force.
Political power, in the context of rural decision making and representation, is
confusing as an attribute as it can be classified as both “a means to an end and
the end itself”174. Srinivas drops political power as a necessary attribute in later
works, focusing more precisely on “ownership in land, numerical strength, status
in local hierarchy, western education and occupation”175. Furthermore, the
concept of the “dominant caste” is separate from that of “decisive dominance”,
which Srinivas defines as the confluence of caste and class at the head of the
social hierarchy176.
On the other end, Dumont’s authoritative work Homo Hierarchicus
(1970) rejects the modern caste system as an hierarchical social structure. He
interpreted India’s ethnic groups, at the time of his publication, as distinct
horizontally competing blocks. While many modern scholars want to subscribe
to this notion of India becoming more democratic and egalitarian, the research is
still mixed. Dumont’s observation of a trend towards decreasing hierarchy is
supported with research like Nilekani and Dunning’s 2013 study. They note the
declining significance in caste associations, and increasing role of party loyalties.
They conclude that these associations are privileged in the contemporary village
setting as a substitution for coethnicity in the familiar patronage based electoral
model. They “find that these [local] politicians mobilize local support by
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distributing targeted benefits to voters along party—more than caste—lines”177,
as an expression of a multi-ethnic party’s goals. Mendelsohn’s research in
Rajasthan178 extends this claim to assert that “There appears to have been a
parallel decline in an awareness of caste as a religiously sanctioned institution
and in traditional councils dominated by a single caste and claiming authority
over other villagers” due to shifts in agrarian structure179.
Both trends seem explanatory in the outcomes perceived in India’s caste
landscape today. Looking at the case of the Jats--specifically, claims from a
dominant caste for reservations under OBC status--will help bring to the fore the
need for a more refined understanding and standardization of OBC eligibility.
Using Srinivas’ logic of a dominant caste in asserting its subjective position in
the 1950s, and tracing the actions and paths of these dominant castes through
Dumont’s logic of the 1970s, this chapter will try and assess the merit behind
these claims in a shifting socioeconomic context. Further, using these cases, this
chapter will address the larger goal of designing a set of recommendations to
refine the OBC eligibility criteria in an increasingly caste-conscious India.

I. OBCs Represented with Data
In order to apply Srinivas’ theory of a dominant caste to particular subcastes of the OBCs, several macro-level patterns must be consistent with the
stated conditions. First, the rural-urban breakdown of OBCs, and subsequent
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discrepancies must be analyzed in order to confirm that it is truly within the rural
realm that dominant castes are active. Secondly, “non-traditional” educational
and occupational patterns will be observed, especially in comparison to other
marginalized groups. Thirdly, conditions such as political power, ritual status,
and numerical strength have already been argued for on a national and/or
regional level in previous chapters, but will also be examined on a case specific
basis in the following section.
Data from the 2001 Census and the National Sample Survey
Organization’s 55th survey (1999-2000) indicates that lower castes still remained
at the bottom of the economic classes. Based on consumption (as a proxy for
income), education, and employment estimates, Mohanty argues that OBCs are
closer in socioeconomic status to SCs and STs than to upper caste Hindus
(UCHs) and those of other religions180. Zacharias and Vakulabharanam use
wealth data from the All India Debt and Investments Survey conducted in 19912 and 2002-3 to note the relative positions, and find that the median wealth of the
urban and rural OBCs was second only to Hindu FCs181 or forward castes-equivalent to Mohanty’s UCHs. Both studies examine the inequality between
different groups and within the same groups, decomposing the data across a
rural-urban divide. Mohanty immediately notes the difference in consumption
levels and patterns for urban versus rural OBCs. He finds that STs, SCs, and
OBCs overwhelmingly reside in rural areas, as opposed to upper caste Hindus
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(UCHs) and those of other religions (equivalent to Zacharias and
Vakulabharnam’s Non-Hindus). Further, he points out that their consumption
levels are also below the average, in the urban and rural samples. Urban OBCs
specifically, were almost 15 per cent lower than the average, whereas their rural
counterparts were “only marginally below average consumption levels”182. He
also notes that while rural OBCs are distinctly consuming more than rural SCs
and STs, urban OBCs are almost at the same level of consumption as urban SCs
and STs183. Zacharias and Vakulabharanam also note this distinction between
urban and rural OBCs, in wealth terms:
[T]he OBCs and non-Hindus occupied positions that placed
them noticeably above the SC/ST groups, but significantly
below the FC in terms of median wealth values. [...] rural
OBCs and non-Hindus are quite stratified from the rural SC
and ST groups; in fact, they are less stratified from their urban
counterparts.184
This data immediately elucidates the rural-urban locus as the source of withinOBC inequality. It is the OBC sub-castes of rural landscapes that are more likely
to be socioeconomically well off relative to other rural lower-caste groups like
Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Educational attainment too seems to have shifted for the OBCs.
Deshpande and Ramachandaran’s 2013 analysis finds that secondary education
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levels for OBCs as compared to non OBCs increased significantly after the
adoption of Mandal185. Although Mandal did not directly reserve educational
seats, public sector jobs require a minimum of ten years of education even for the
lowest level of positions, thereby indirectly creating incentives for eligible OBCs
to complete their education. Mohanty notes from the 2001 data that dropout and
literacy rates for rural OBCs were closer to Scheduled Caste and Tribes levels as
compared to UCHs. Urban OBCs experienced levels almost in the middle of
UCHs and Scheduled Castes, closer to Scheduled Tribes. Basant and Sen’s 2018
analysis considers more recent data from the 61st NSSO survey (from 2004-5),
and creates various measures for higher education, based on currently enrolled
students, or the “current generation flow measure”, to judge the 2006 decision to
expand OBC reservations to higher education186. They define a “deficit” as the
difference between participation in higher education and the respective share of
the social group in the eligible population, so that “if the [eligible] population
share is higher than the share in graduates, the group suffers from a “deficit” in
participation”187. Their claims are made with the caveat that the populations of
marginalised students eligible for higher education is lesser than those of UCHs,
hypothesized to be due to the fact that primary and secondary school access is
still lower for marginalized groups than it is for UCHs. Yet, the data suggests
that when controlling for eligibility--or within the population of those who have
graduated from higher secondary education-- “an eligible candidate, be she/he a
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marginalised or a non-marginalised student, has today an equal chance of going
to college, and in some cases, the chances are even better for marginalised
student”188. This was supported specifically in the case of the OBCs, who make
9.74 per cent of the eligible populations within the age group of 22-35 years, and
28.61 per cent within the age group of 17-29 years, and make up a 28.2 per cent
share among those currently enrolled to graduate189. Thus, the deficit for OBCs
is insignificant.
Modern employment is yet another condition for dominance according
to Srinivas. Deshpande and Ramachandaran look at employment-unemployment
data from the 1999-2000 and 2009-20 National Sample Surveys to observe
changes in employment patterns of the OBCs, and compare these to those
observed for non-marginalized groups and Scheduled Castes and Tribes190.
Based off of differences in educational attainment, occupational differences were
verified along lines of skills. The average years of education were consistent
with the level of skill in the job classifications, i.e the average number of years
of education for those engaged in white collar jobs was 9.45, blue-collar jobs
was 5.07, and agricultural jobs was 3.41191. Over the observed time, the
reduction in agricultural employment is matched by an increase in blue and
white collar employment across all social and caste groups--a typical structural
shift in developing and liberalizing economies. Between 1930s and the 1970s,
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the increase in non-marginalized groups employed in the white collar jobs,
however, have significantly surpassed the increase of the OBC and Scheduled
Castes and Tribes in the same skill level jobs. For OBCs specifically born
between the 1950s and the 1970s, the same estimates have steadily moved
towards convergence with those for non-marginalized, “The overall picture for
the OBCs shows that for cohorts born after 1946-55 the gaps in proportion with
white-collar to the Others [all non-marginalized groups], is decreasing or
remaining constant”192. This steady pattern is not observed for cohorts of
Scheduled Castes and Tribes, who only move towards convergence in smaller,
sporadic time periods. This convergence is in part credited to the 1990 Mandal
recommendations being adopted, as those born within these time periods would
be eligible for public service position reservations in the 1990s. However, it is
also in part credited to shifts in educational attainment, as it is observed in both
public and private sector lines193.
Comparing the groups along the lines of “regular wage/salaried” (RWS)
jobs and casual labor, the data show a sharp increase in RWS employment for
those born between 1926 and 1965 for all groups, with a diminishing rate of
increase for those born between 1965 and 1985, “indicating that economic
growth has not been accompanied with access to formal secure jobs”194.
Employment in casual labor also has increased for all groups, however, the
OBCs and the non-marginalized groups experience similar rates of increases in
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casual labor-- which are significantly lower rates than those experienced by
Scheduled Castes and Tribes. In other words, the proportion of Scheduled Castes
and Tribes employed in casual labor is increasing relative to OBCs and nonmarginalized groups over consecutive years195.
While OBCs as whole are still disadvantaged in comparison to Upper
Caste Hindus and other non-Hindus, they are better off than their Scheduled
Caste and Tribe counterparts in terms of consumption, wealth, education, and
employment. Further, OBCs have shown steady increases in educational
attainment--in primary and higher education--at rates surpassing those of
Scheduled Castes and Tribes. Employment too, has shown a shift from
agriculture to blue- and (some) white-collar jobs. Given these general trends in
the socioeconomic, educational, and occupational status of OBCs relative to nonmarginalized and Scheduled groups, on a macro level it is clear that the group as
a whole seems upwardly mobile. Yet, around election season, newspapers in
India will be littered with stories of downwardly mobile groups demanding
reservations under the OBC quotas. These demands are often, eventually, met as
well. Some discrepancies from the data relayed above may point towards an
explanation of such inconsistencies. Although mean and median levels of wealth,
consumption, and access to education are higher for all urban groups than for
their rural counterparts, the rural OBCs are closer to urban OBCs’ levels of
wealth and consumption. Rural OBCs specifically, are much better off than
Scheduled Caste and Tribe members of their locale in these regards. Further,
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access to education and literacy levels in rural regions is veritably crippled when
compared to those in urban regions. Several factors play into this estimation,
such as the availability and quality of teachers, coverage of schools and private
alternatives, prevalence of cultural norms, infrastructure and basic facilities,
geography of the region, and local economy, among others196. Lastly, declining
agricultural employment--which is mostly a rural activity--has led to increases in
rural non-farm employment that makes up a significant part of household
incomes across Indian villages197. Castes previously engaged in agriculture have
tended to adopt these alternatives, as this switch requires significant investments
that migrant caste groups or landless laborers do not often possess198. Such nonfarm employment can either be more or less caste heterogeneous--this depends
on several external variables--and has impacts on the position of a dominant
caste and the direction of their socioeconomic mobility. A pattern “of a gradual
reduction in the share of non-agricultural employment and earnings for
disadvantaged groups” is consistently observed in several villages, such as with
the “high-ranked thakurs” in western Uttar Pradesh and villages in Punjab199.
With a majority of marginalized groups occupying rural areas, this is especially
important to lay the groundwork for the resuscitation or decline of dominant
castes. The next subsection will look closely at the case of a dominant caste
demanding OBC status, and evaluate the basis and merit of their claims.
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II.

The Jats of Haryana: A Case Study

The Jats of Haryana pose an ideal example of Srinivas’ dominant caste, seeking
reservations on the basis of perceptions of backwardness. In early 2016, the Jats
of Haryana led a mass agitation demanding reservations in government jobs and
higher education under the OBC status. The agitation was marked with unrest in
Haryana, where members of the community set vehicles, public buildings, and
houses on fire; damaged roads, highways, and train tracks; blocked water supply
to Gurgaon; and robbed an arsenal, leading to the death of 15 people200. This
unrest was the third of its kind at the hands of the Jats, a dominant caste in much
of Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Punjab, Bihar and other northern states.
The first agitation was in demand of OBC status in the central list of the OBCs,
controlled by the National Commission of Backward Classes (NCBC), made by
the Jats of Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, and Madhya Pradesh in 1997. The NCBC
rejected this claim, yet the Vajpayee led National Democratic Alliance (NDA)
government granted inclusion in the central OBC list for Jats in Rajasthan. Soon
after, Congress’ representative for the 2004 Haryana State Legislative Assembly
elections--Bhupinder Singh Hooda--successfully ran for candidacy on a platform
that promised quotas for Jats, but did not deliver on this promise immediately.
The second set of protests were executed in 2012, and addressed shortly
before the 2014 elections by the Congress led United Progressive Alliance
(UPA) government that declared that Jats from Haryana, Gujarat, Delhi,
200
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Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and
Bihar would be included in the central OBC list. The NCBC responded to these
demands and declarations by instating a survey to review the condition of the
Jats in the respective states. The survey results concluded that the Jats in these
states were comparable to upper castes. Nevertheless, in anticipation of the 2014
Haryana Assembly elections, Congress’ state representative, Hooda, was able to
validate the Jats as a “Special Backward Class” (SBC) offering them ten per cent
reservation vis-à-vis an executive order. By March of 2015, including the Jats in
the central-level OBC list was rejected by the Supreme Court, and by July of the
same year the state-level executive order by the Congress led Assembly was
challenged and stayed by the Punjab and Haryana High Courts.
With the third and most recent agitation in 2016, the Jats of Haryana
demanded reservations only under the state OBC list. In response to the unrest,
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led Haryana government offered a renewal of
the SBC status for Jats and five other sub-castes, with the ten per cent quotas in
public jobs and higher education. This was achieved by the Haryana government,
withdrawing the original executive order that was petitioned by the High Courts.
By withdrawing this original precedent, the petition was “rendered infructuous”.
The Haryana Legislative Assembly then passed a bill called the Haryana
Backward Classes (Reservation in Services and Admission in Educational
Institutions) Bill to this effect, and submitted it the Centre requesting that it be
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included in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution201. The Ninth Schedule allows
“umbrella protection” or “fictional immunity”, i.e partial immunity from judicial
review and complete immunity from further challenges to all laws placed under
it. The Parliament reserves the power to discriminate between laws that should
be placed under the Ninth Schedule, as long as they are violating neither a
fundamental right nor the “basic structure” doctrine. The basic structure doctrine
was advocated in a landmark case, and postulates that while the Parliament can
amend the Constitution, it cannot mutate the basic structure of the three organs
of government, the bicameral features, electoral and federal formats, or the
separation of powers, etc202.
The story of the Jats, however, does not begin with agitations on the
railway tracks. The Jats are a typical example of a dominant caste. In 1860s
western Uttar Pradesh, Jats existed as intermediates between the upper castes and
Shudras--yet experienced much of the stigma of being lower caste, “though the
Jats were not considered Shudras [...] the Brahmins never lost an opportunity to
humiliate them”203. Upper castes not only treated them like Shudras but also
labelled them as such, despite a growing consciousness of their intermediate
identity within the Jat sub-caste. Anxieties about the nature of their caste, and
subjectivity in the varna system made the Jats especially vulnerable to the
Sanskritization already prevalent in the North. The Arya Samaj, the only Hindu
organization to sanction conversions, led mass conversions for Jats beginning in
201
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1880s and continuing until 1912204. The Jats found a leader in Swami Dayanand,
and practiced the precepts of the Samaj, albeit an appropriated version as
interpreted through the “selective reading of Arya Samaj texts”205. Over time,
non-Arya Samajist Jats were overpowered, and a new Sanskritized Jat identity
was forged--one rooted in a “distinct, strong, masculine, homogeneous
community” that opposed the Brahmins206. They came to claim the status of a
Kshatriya, the warrior caste, on the varna, as dispersed in narratives of Dayanand
presenting the Jats with the sacred thread traditionally worn by Kshatriyas207.
Thus, “Jat identity was formed through the creation of imagined pasts; through
myths of kingship, kinship, warrior origin [...] defined itself primarily as a force
in opposition to the British, Muslims and upper and lower-caste Hindus”208.
Haryana as a state was created in 1966 from a part of Punjab, due to linguistic
differences between people of the region and the rest of Punjab209. It is estimated
that Jats constitute roughly an estimated 25 per cent of the state’s electorate210
and make up 29 per cent of its population211. The formation of Haryana gave the
Jats numerical supremacy in the state212. The Jats transformed materially from
tenant farmers into a dominant land owning caste largely as a result of the
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tenancy laws under the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms of 1952213. With
the Green Revolution beginning in the 1960s, new peasant proprietors such as
the Jats gained disproportionately. The mechanization of farms, especially those
in Punjab, and later Haryana, led to greater agricultural productivity and yields,
which in turn made the farming Jats of the region wealthier, “strengthen[ing] the
economic and spatial dominance of Jats [...] and promot[ing] class differentiation
within this caste”214.
This rise in wealth was supplemented with the policies of Jat politicians
such as Charan Singh. By the 1970s, when OBC political parties formed an
alliance under the Janata Party--the Jats formed the base of the peasant
supporters for the popular leader Charan Singh. Charan Singh left the Congress
to create the Bharatiya Kranti Dal, a party of a mostly Jat voter base with the
mandate of representing “rural India” and protecting it from the hegemonic
power of the overreaching upper caste elites of urban India. Yet, his party
represented largely “middle and rich peasants across Uttar Pradesh”215, and he
was for the most part, “indifferent to the condition of the landless laborers”216.
Scholars acknowledge that “The proponents of "kisan politics" came primarily
from the rank peasant-proprietors who tried to mobilize "the peasants" --as if that
were a social category without internal differentiation--to promote their own
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interest and maintain lower castes under their influence”217. Singh famously
passed several policies to favor his base of rich peasant proprietors, such as the
increase of subsidies directed towards agriculture, and the reduction of taxation
on agricultural inputs, etc. when he was a cabinet minister in the late
1970s218.
A dominant peasant based identity was also fostered with the
organization of Jat farmers on the village level, specifically in western Uttar
Pradesh and other regions of the Hindi Belt, into collectives such as the
Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU) in the 1980s219. Rural non-farm sources of
income and employment have gained momentum in many parts of North India
since then, however, the caste heterogeneity of the group that can best exploit
these new opportunities is a function of preexisting social institutions220. In the
case of villages in much of north India, Jats have been able to actively exert their
dominance via traditional socio-political forums known as khap panchayats.
Khaps refer to clan settlements, implying the number of villages in which the
Jats are present in a particular locale. A khap panchayat is the traditional
governing body for all of the Jats in a specific khap. With forces such as the
Green Revolution, increasing non-farm employment, and political emancipation,
“These traditional social institutions, which gave an early boost to agrarianism
and the growth of organizations like the BKU, did not wither away with
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urbanization”221. These khaps also played crucial mobilization and organization
roles in the most recent protests of 2016222.
Today, Jat dominance is threatened by the declining size of agricultural
landholdings223, and the progress of other village communities into modern
education and non-farm employment: “The Jats, [...] haven’t really made the
transition from being a predominantly rural-based community tethered to the
village or the local khap [...] have remained inward-looking, while not
progressing much beyond peasant-sepoy, constable, small-town lawyer, [...]
There aren’t too many software professionals, management executives, doctors
or engineers, leave alone start-up entrepreneurs”224. While other rural groups
have begun to engage in processing and non-farming activities, the Jats have
failed to diversify. Furthermore, the value of their agricultural outputs has
declined further with land ownership becoming increasingly irrelevant. Despite
their overall dominance today, “in their imaginings of themselves, ethnic groups
[Jats] tend to accentuate the primordial and the historically unchanging”225 to
base their claims of backwardness.

III.

Evaluation

The Jats are not alone in this trajectory. The Patels of Gujarat agitated
on the basis of similar claims in 2015, and the Marathas of Maharashtra
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replicated this format in 2016. In each case, the group comprises the respective
state’s majority population (more than 20 per cent, the Marathas form more than
30 per cent), is well represented politically, is economically intermediate,
dominate agricultural resources, and occupy rural regions226. These groups each
suffer from a deficit in educational and employment levels relative to castes of
their economic status, and have not been able to cope with the socio-economic
changes that are perceived to threaten their downward mobility: “The Marathas
not only resent the rise of the OBCs and the Dalits in the educational system
because of reservations, they also cannot compete with upper castes because of
their under-representation in the English-medium colleges [...] The Patels are
similarly affected, despite their increasing presence in expensive private
universities”227.
Perhaps such claims for affirmative action do have some legitimate
basis. The Jats, Patels, and Marathas lack modern education and occupational
skills. Affirmative action could encourage inclusion in non-traditional skill
building to diversify their incomes. Data on OBCs above confirms the demandpull effect that affirmative action creates. However, this conclusion of the Jat
case is laid on faulty assumptions about, first, the criteria for OBC classification,
and, second, the costs of extending it to a dominant caste. The OBC criteria,
although routinely weakened, still determine eligibility on a socio-economic
basis. While the Jats were once marginalized, they enjoy material, political,
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ideological, reputational, and numerical power today. Their political importance
and strength is exhibited in the way that their riots could in fact instill fear in
several governments, and eventually in the extent of the measures that the
Haryana government was willing to take in order to ensure their reservation.
They are in a position to take advantage of the new opportunities. The cost of
including a caste capable of competing without affirmative action is that they
will compete, and monopolize, even more successfully with affirmative action.
This denies some of the reserved spots from those truly incapable of competing,
like the lower groups of the OBC category.
While Mendelsohn and Dumont’s school of thought describes an India
where the strict varna hierarchy has dissipated to make way for “a universe of
impenetrable blocks, self sufficient, essentially identical and in competition with
one another”228, they largely overlook the internal heterogeneity within these
blocks of convenience. Yet, the subjective position of the higher castes has
transformed from that of Srinivas’ “decisive[ly] dominan[t]” to one approaching
convergence with the creamy layer of the intermediate castes. Socioeconomic
forces have reshaped relative dominance in the Indian village. Today, caste and
historical marginalization, while still largely representative of the extremes, do
little to indicate “backwardness” of intermediate castes. This conclusion,
however, does not discredit affirmative action completely. In fact, ascriptive
affirmative action can be credited in the formation of an OBC elite and the
increased participation of lower castes in politics. This conclusion does,
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however, orient the reader to seek a reform of the existing policy, hopefully,
along lines that do not disproportionately benefit those who are able to make
their demands the most vocally.

80

Chapter 6: Policy Recommendations

With the capture of an inappropriately high proportion of reserved seats in higher
education and public sector positions by the creamy layer of the OBCs, the
MBCs or “Most Backward Classes” are not as upwardly mobile or competitive.
Furthermore, with the vague and inconsistent criteria of OBC, the counter
mobilization of intermediate castes via sanskritization in the North, and the
political exploitation of caste classifications into pressure groups, these
intermediate castes find it relatively easy to appropriate the OBC category to
include their historical backwardness or current socioeconomic decline. With
more than 70 per cent of the population eligible for reservations that are capped
at 50 per cent by the Supreme Court, the expansion of OBC reservations will
render them ineffective and potentially harmful. Expanding the list of OBCs will
enable and encourage greater competition over a very limited public good.
Within the context of low literacy in a patronage democracy, those most able to
compete will corner off the greatest portion of the reservations. In order to
ensure that affirmative action provisions reach those that most need it,
developing a more focused criteria and enforceable mechanism must be the
State’s prerogative.
Affirmative action deals with the politics of identity--the very core of a
nation’s multifaceted people. It takes into consideration historical animosities
and resentment, in a context of shifting inter-group relations. While it can not
mitigate all identity based differences or force groups to live in so-called
81

harmony, good policy design does have the power to minimize frivolous costs
and maximize social benefits. The policy as it stands today may not be the most
sophisticated or efficient; however, it does crudely acknowledge obvious
inequalities. The use of caste as a heuristic for disadvantage is better than not
addressing it at all, and can be useful as a starting point. However, in reforming
reservation policies in India to become more targeted, the distortive cases that
delegitimize its original intentions must be analysed and compared. Major
patterns and similarities point to loopholes in current policy that must be
addressed. With the OBC category, the similarities of the distortive cases lies in
their threatened socioeconomic standing, professional and educational
disenfranchisement, and perceptions of self-proclaimed backwardness that
remain inconsistent with larger macro level analyses.
These perceptions of backwardness can be explained by intra-group
class differentiation. Within specific dominant sub-castes, like the Jats, a few
remain that have achieved great success and been able to cope with increasing
non-farm or urban competition, who have now created an upper class within the
sub-caste. In educational and professional terms, dominant sub-castes exhibit
heterogeneity, with the wealthiest fracturing a disproportionately larger portion
of the sub-caste’s total income:
The highest quintile (20 per cent of the caste group) gets 48 per
cent of the total income of the Marathas with a mean per capita
income of Rs 86,750. The lowest quintile of the Marathas earns
ten times less (Rs 7,198) and the quintile just above, only Rs
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16,285. Which means that the 40 per cent poorest get less than
13 per cent of the total income of the caste — and are lagging
behind the Scheduled Caste elite.229
Similarly, the Gini coefficient of the Patels of Gujarat has risen from 0.49 to 0.57
from 2004-5 to 2011-12230. This class differentiation within sub-castes has been
shown to present the perfect condition for inter-caste cornering of resources, for
example, with the case of the Malis and Kunbis231. Further, reservations in public
sector positions result in meager employment shifts, with private sector
employment progressively increasing. Reservations do not pose a solution for
large portions of the state’s population. Yet, these groups remain politically
homogeneous. Thus, caste-based reservations are not a solution for demands
from a legitimate rationale of poverty. They are rather, a convenient way for
upper classes of broad caste groups, like the creamy layer of the OBCs, to funnel
state resources in exchange for electoral support. This mechanism is made more
efficient with the overlapping of the upper classes of the caste groups and the
benefiting political elite. This modified form of lobbying, on the basis of
ascriptive characteristics and in exchange for power over state resources, is
costly for the Indian government. Anne Krueger posed a conservative estimate of
rent-seeking to cost roughly 7.4 per cent of India’s national income232.
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Mohammad and Whalley replicated her study with more inclusive criteria and
approximated the costs to be closer to 30-45 per cent233.

I. The Karnataka Comparison
Karnataka is a state that has seen extraordinary success in uplifting the
socioeconomic conditions of the OBCs, “According to the Indian Human
Development Survey, in 2011-12, the annual per capita mean income of the
OBCs represented 89 per cent of that of the dominant castes — Lingayats and
Vokkaligas — in Karnataka”234. This has been achieved due to the state’s
targeted approach on poverty alleviation measures, which have
disproportionately benefited the most backward of the OBCs over the dominant,
such as food distribution and cash transfer programs. It has also been achieved
with the careful use of reservation policies. Where Gujarat OBCs are offered 15
per cent reservations in jobs, Karnataka only offered 12 per cent. Instead,
Karnataka has focused on expanding reservations in education over those in jobs,
“the percentage of graduates among the Karnataka OBCs is slightly above that of
the dominant castes, 4.8 per cent against 4.6 per cent. Gujarat OBCs lag behind,
with only 2.1 per cent of the state OBCs reaching the graduation level, almost
five times less than the dominant castes”235. An increase in education focused
reservations without an increase in job reservations is a strategy that proved
more effective in uplifting the most marginalized in Karnataka. Building on a
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proportionately higher focus on educational positive discrimination, reservation
policy can exercise further precision by using the creamy-layer category as an
intermediate buffer category between OBCs and the general category. The
framework within which OBC reservations must operate to become more precise
is an acknowledgment of degrees of separation between the most backward, the
creamy layer, and then the general category. While the NCBC has already
identified a creamy layer, the category has--for the most part--not been invoked
in reservation policy. Currently, seats in higher education only discriminate
between OBC and general category (apart from the Scheduled Castes and
Tribes). In the admissions process, a simple revision could require institutions to
prioritize the most backward castes to fill reserved seats first, and if seats remain
unfilled (as is already the trend)236 they should be filled by those of the creamy
layer castes instead of being opened directly to the general category237.
However, such subdivision can only have limited success, as it does not
adequately address the problematic incentive to identify as backward. If this
subdivision is to be continued, there could be infinitesimal categories of
backwardness: as many categories as there as castes and then further divided into
sub-castes, khaps, villages, and families, each of which still have internal
inequality by some measure. These subdivisions could function essentially like
an income test, and still not dissuade groups to misrepresent their status to
benefit from state resources. In addressing this incentive, the process of
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identification must be broken down into its two components, the first is the
criteria of backwardness and the second is the process of reporting it.
The Supreme Court of India, the final keeper of the “sluice gates”,
warned that “The gates would be opened only to permit entry of the most
distressed” in response to the case of Patels seeking OBC status, and has
acknowledged the flaws in “the identification of a group as backward solely on
the basis of caste”238. A natural response could be to redesign affirmative action
policy from the basis of caste to the basis of class; however, this logic is fairly
reductive of the true complexities of present inequities. Proponents of classbased OBC reservations fail to acknowledge that using only economic standing
as the criterion for discrimination within a broad category is burdened with a set
of challenges comparable to those of using only caste. First, it does not address
the question of reparations for historical atrocities, and discrimination that cannot
be valued in economic terms. Secondly, it has the ability to perpetuate and
“reinforce beliefs about the inferiority of the subaltern group”239, especially for
anomalous cases in a changed socioeconomic setting.
Thus, the criteria must be one that considers several factors that define
backwardness, weighting each to create a diverse ranking order between
economic and social marginalization. In this respect, a debate on the essence of
backwardness, historical and contemporary, as well as the State’s priorities must
begin. At this point in India’s history of affirmative action, the policymakers are
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faced with a bifurcation in its path. It can choose to either recognize and
represent identities, or create an overarching national one that supersedes them.
The relationship between identity and the nation must be debated, with an
acknowledgment of the past majority-minority relations. If the latter is
prioritized, a process of assimilation, similar to the one currently observed most
notably in France, would follow. With the expansion of Hindu nationalist
sentiment, and the dilution of minority identities as anti-national, this process is
already in motion today.
If the State prioritizes the former, it must respect several separate
narratives within the national. Apart from income (some argue wealth is a better
indicator240) and caste, parameters such as gender, asset, religious, regional, and
(guardians’) occupational disparities must be acknowledged. This is necessary to
begin a process where castes respect identities, including their own, while
consciously acknowledging the changed social context within which they are
now applicable to an hierarchy. To achieve this, the Census must be replaced as
an authority with a less hierarchical understanding of caste today. This could be
in the form of a reaffirmation of the intentions of affirmative action, and a nation
wide evaluation of the Census’ changed relevance today. WIth the coordination
of state and central level governments, the individual priorities of states can be
framed within the larger national context.
Once an inclusive and multifaceted eligibility criteria is crafted, the power of
determination of eligibility must be retained--either by State or by universities.
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This necessitates the weight for each parameter to remain private, distinct for
each university, or both. This will replace the current practice of applicants selfreporting caste-based eligibility based off of public state and national lists and
providing certification for proof, with the practice of solely reporting caste as
one of several other parameters. With the self-reporting of eligibility, the
salience of caste is handed down to each new generation of applicants, with
individuals like Sneha Sekhsaria, 25, of Calcutta, who reported, “When I was
filling out my college application forms, there was this box for caste [...] I had to
ask my dad what our caste was, and he had to think about it for 15 minutes
before telling me that we were in the general category”241. Instead of reserving
discrete seats for each, the intersectionality and interaction of the parameters
must be sewn together into a function that determines the weighted
backwardness of a candidate, which will in turn inform their subjective merit for
admission.

II.

Shifting Priorities

Shifting priorities from personal short term gains to social long term
benefits requires a reformation in the understanding of the State and its
relationship with its citizens. Perhaps a legacy of India’s socialist leaning roots,
the view of the State as a provider of jobs and resources hinders dominant castes
from seeking private sector involvement and employment alternatives.
Furthermore, it enables political rent seeking with elites providing public
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resources, that should be non-rivalrous and non-excludable, in exchange for
votes to only specific groups.
While adding several parameters and creating a more diverse eligibility
criteria will not put an end to resentment from those who are not granted
admission, it will dilute the caste based resentment. In the longer run, removing
the salience and consequent manipulation of caste identities must begin much
earlier--in primary and secondary schools. Reserving seats in higher education
and jobs does not address the stark reality that is the inequality of education
access at the primary school levels. While some private schools in urban areas
have accommodated lower-caste students with their general classes, education
remains highly segregated with most lower-caste children studying in public
schools of much lower quality--insofar as access permits them. Another
interpretation of the same statement is the acknowledgement of backwardness.
Histories of backward communities and the meaning of a lower-caste identity
must be taught and respected as part of the school curriculum to prevent
resentment and appropriation, and in place foster an acknowledgment of
society’s past wrongs.
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